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CHAPTER I
Sec. I

STATEMENT.

The subject of Inter-state rendition

of fugitives from justice is broad in its scope and has given
rise to a great axiount of litigation.

Immediately on the

adoption of Art. 4 Sec.2 of the Constitution, the difficulties
of the question began to present themselves, and courts have
been wrestling with various phases of it since that time.
For many years prior to the Civil War this question was the
occasion of many judicial battles between the slave-holding
States of the South and the non slave-holding States of the
North.

Bitter hatreds were engendered, ard too often the

courts were led to sacrifice judicial precision and fairness
upon the altar of political contention.

With the abolition

of slavery many of the more vexatious questions connected with
the law of inter-state extradition found their solution: otherz
have finally come to rest in the decisions of the courts of
last resort.

There yet remains a branch of the subject, how-

ever, upon which the courts have arrived at widely differing,
and, in certain cases, directly conflicting conclusions.

This

branch of the subject embraces the delicate question as to tle

proper field for the exercise of State and National legislation in matters pertaining to Inter-state, extradition.
The subject naturally falls into two parts:
1.

As to the character of the substanti & right created

by Article 4 Section 2 of the Constitution, and,
2.

As to Procedure under the right thus created.

Under (1) will be considered (a) the implied restraints upon
the States Rnd (b) the express restraints.
Under (2) will be considered

a) the procedure provided for by

the Act of Congress of Feb. 12th 1793, and kb) the opportunity
for State legislation.
As to the Character of the Right.
Sec.

2

IMPLIED RESTRAINTS UIPON STATE LEGISLATION.

The

Constitution of the United States Art. 4 Sec. 2 Clause 2 provides, "A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or
other Crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another State shall on demand of the executive authority of the
State from which he fled be delivered up to be removed to the
State having jurisdiction of the crime".
At the outset the following questions confront us:
1.

Does this clause of the Constitution merely declare

the already existing right of a State to derand an offender

0

against thf laws from another State to which he has fled for
refuge; or,
2.

Does it impliedly take from the States this attri-

bute of sovereignty and make the right enforceable only under
the sanction of the National government?
The question is largely one of construction, and it will be
the inmediate purpose of this article to show that the latter
view was the one entertained by the framers of the Constitut!on.

True the National government is one of strictly limit-

ed poweri: only such powers are exercised by it as are given
expressly or by implication by the Constitution.

In express

words the exclusive power over Inter-state extradition has not
been given to the National goverrinent, but from the earliest
colonial experience,

it

has been -perfectly clear that the sub-

Ject is peculiarly a proper one for National regulation.

The

close proximity of the States rendered it a very easy matter
for a criminal to flee from one and take sanctuary in
It

another.

was apparent that action based upon State comity would very

inadequately cope with the evils that would arise if criminals
might set the laws of an offended State at defiance by merely
stepping across an imaginary line.
Sec. 2 a

EARLY LEGISLATION.

As early as the year 1643

the plantations under the government of Massachusettes, New
Plymouth, New Haven, and Connecticut, respectively, by their
Articles of Confederation were compelled to deliver criminls
and escaping convicts to the 'plantations having jurisdiction
of the offenoe.(a)

The same articlwas renewed substan-

tially in the year I670.(b)

These regulations remained

in force until they were supplanted by the Articles of ConArticle 4 of the

federation adopted in the year 1777.
Articles of Confederation provided,

"

If any person guilty

of, or charged with, treason, felony or other high misdemeanors in any State shall flee from justice and be found
in any other of the United States, he shall upon the demand
of the governor or executive power of the State from which
he fled be delivered up to the State having jurisdiction
of the offence".

This article as well as those of 1640

and 1670 referred to above evidently intended to leave no
room for discretionary action on the part of the States.
The language is imperative, not conditional.

So far as

the right itself was concerned it was the plain intention
to make it strictly National.
a) 1 Winthrop's Hlist.
b) Mass.

Rec.

vol.

of i,.ass. vol.2 pp.121,

4 pt.

2 pp.471-3.

126.

See. 2 b.

Ten years after the adoption of the Articles

of Confederation, the 'present clause of the Constitution was
agreed upon.

By comparison it will at once be seen that the

clause in the Articles of Confederation was in spirit and intent incorporated in the Constitutional clause referred to.
The object aimed at in both was the same, viz; to make the ri
right to demand a fugitive from justice an absolute one.

Catron in Holmes v Jennison.k a),

C.J.

Such being the effect of

Art.4 See. 2 of the Constitution, it follows as a necessary
conclusion thpt any legislation on the part of a State that
conflicts with this clause is null and void, since the Constitution is the "supreme law of the land".

To what extent

State legislation may be invoked to carry the righ6 into ex-

ecution is a topic to be considered later.
Sec. 3

EXPRESS RESTRAINTS UPON STATE LEGISLATION.

By

necessary implication therefore, State laws that derive khpLr
force or effect from a source other than Art.
Constitution are of nU-fas well as implied restraints.

e.

4 Sec.

2 of the

But there are express

It has been maintained by

certair. State courts that the right to deliver up fugitives
from justice was originally exercised by the States, and that
Va) Holmes v Jennison 14 Peters 597.

it had never been taken away.
State v Buzine,k a)

For exariple,

the court said,

in the case of

"The right to deliver over

fugitives from justice was certainly not abrogated by the colonies severing the ties which bound the. to the mother country
It was not therefore derived from the Constitution but existed independent of it".

This may be true and yet the States

may not now have the right even as it existed as a matter of
comity prior to the adoption of the Constitution.
There are certain clauses of the Constitution to which
the readers attontion is now invited which apparently preclude
any possibility of the exercise by the States of the right in
question.

In the Constitutional clause immediately preceding

the one in question as if intended to be a limitatiom, it is
provided:" The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
privileges and imnities of the citizens of the several States.
The right of a citizen to reside in any State certainly falls
within these privileges.

Any person therefore who removes

from one State and takes up his residence in another can not
be nxpelled from his new home in any other way than that provided for in

the Constitution. k b

(a) State v Buzine. 4 Harr. 574.
(b) Ex parte Smith 3 McLean 121: State v Huffard 28 Iowa 39.
Ex parte Clark 9 Wend 212: In re Hayward I Sandf. 701.
Ex parte White 49 Cal. 433.Ex parte Thornton 9 Tex. 635.

Article 1 Sec. 10 Clause 5 of the Constitution provides
"No State shall without the consent of Congress ----

enter into

any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign
power".

This clause received an interpretation by the Sup-

reme Court of the United States in the celebrated case of Holmes v Jennison.( a)

The facts of the case so far as pertinent

in the present connoction are as follows: George Holmes, the
plaintiffin error, was arrested in the State of Vermont on a
warrant issued by Silas A. Jennison as Governor of the State.
The arrest was in pursuant to an indictment for murder found
by a grand jury of Quebec, L. C.

The sheriff was coramanded

to conduct the prisoner to a designated place on the confines
of the State of Vermont and there deliver him to such agents
of the Canadian province as should be empowered to receive
him.

On application to the Supreme Court of Vermont a writ

of Habeas Corpus was granted Holmes, and upon a hearing of the
parties, the judgment of the court was as follows:"Wherefore
after a full hearing of the parties, and all and singular the
premises aforesaid beeing seen and fully examined it is adjudged by the court here that the aforesaid cause of detention
and imprisonment of the said George Holmes is good and suffic(a) Holmes v Jennison 14 Peters 561.

From this decision, the plaintiff in error

ient in law".

appealcd to the United States Supreme Court.

The Chief Jus-

tice in delivering the oU1inion of the court expressed himself
as follows:"It remains for us to inquire whether the power in
question has been surrendered by the States.

We think it has)

and upon two grounds.
1.

According to the express words of the Constitution

it is one of the powers that tthe States are forbidden to exercise without the consent of Congress.
2.

It

is

incompatable and inconsistent with the powers

conferred on the Federal government".
Again he says,"The Supreme Court of Vermont,
ready mentioned,

as we have al-

has decided that the warrant of the Governor

and the detention of Holmes under dt are authorized by law.
Consequently, the seizure for the purpose of delivery, the
agreement on the one side to deliver and on the other side to
receive, is an agreement made by the authorized servants of
the State; and of course, in contemplation of law, made by the
/

State itself.

On these grounds the action of the State of

Vermont was held unconstitutional
that the "agreement"

and on prithipU the fact

was between Vermont and a province of

Canada would not be less an "agroement"

if

between Vermont and

What would amount to a"compact or agreement"

a sister State.

in the one case would be the same in the other.
By considering the express and implied restraints imposed
upon State legislation Ps set forth above, in connection with
each other it is confidently believed that the following propositions have been established, or follow as corrolaries to
those vhich have:
1.

That the right on the part of a State to demand an

offender against its laws from the State to which he has fleed
exists only by virtue of Art. 4 Sec. C Clause C of the Constitution; and that the obligation to deliver on the part of the
asylum State is
2.

absolute.

State laws .:hich are in conflict with this clause

of the Constitution are
3.

nconstitutional and void.

In the absence of Art. 4 Sec. 2 Clause 2 of the Con-

stitution no State would have the -ower to deliver a fugitive
from justice to the State having jurisdiction of his crime.
Such being the conclusimons arrived at with reference to
the substantive right, it yet remainsWexplain the means employed to carry this right into execution, and to discover if
possible what portions of the procedure fall under the purview
respectively, of State and National legislation.

This will

forin the subject if inquiry in the two succeeding chapters.
C1TAFTER II.
Sec. I

DIVERSITY OF PROCEDLT R4 AXIONG THE STATES.

The

number of judicial decisions required to establish the law as
set forth in Chaiter I is by no means so great as will be
found to be the case with the question now to be considered.
for the questions coming under this head have more frequently
come before the State courts for adjudication.

This is owing

to the fact that many of the steps necessary to be taken in
the rrocess of demanding and delivering up a fugitive from
justic, are left unprovided for by Congress, and the States
themselves have adopted rules for their own guidance.

Certai

States as Ohio and 1assachusettes have passed laws regulating
the entire matter of procedure.

A number of other States

have substantially re-enacted the Act of Congresz of 1793.
The Statutes of still other States are wholly silent, in which
case of course, the rules established by Congress are followed
in the same way as if re-enacted by their own Statutes.

This

utter lack of uniformity is significant to show how widely
differing are the opinions with respect to the propriety of
State legislation.

Ohio for example, has undertaken to reg-

ulate the entire matter and in certain casas has adopted rules

which conflict with the Congressional Act of 1793.

It shall

be the purpose of the remainder of this article to discover
how far such powers are properly exercised.
See. 2

TIM CONSTITUTION AND ACT OF 1793.

By a re-

currerce to Article 4 Section 2 Clause 2 of the Constitution,
it will be seen that like many other clauses of the Constitution, it is selfacting.

Legislation became necessary

to give it force and effect.

The language is,

"

A person

charged in any State with Treason, Felony or other Crime,
who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State,
shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State
from which he fled be delivered up and removed to the State
having jurisdiction of the crime".

Here the right itself

is rendered certain and unequivocal but the mode of execution
is wholly unlirovided for.

It speaks of

"

a person charged"

&c, but the manner in which the charge is to be made must
be determined separate and apart from the clause itself.
person charged must be one

"

The

who shall flee from justice",

but nothing is said as to how the fact of fleeing shall be
ascertained.

The proper authority to make the demand is

pointed out but no one is specified upon whom the demand is to
be made.

The fugitive "shall be delivered up" &.c,

but how

he may be arrested is not indicated.

The necessary inference

to be made from these facts is that the States should provide
means for making the Constitutional clause operative.

As was

said in In Re Romainet a)"This provision being a part of the
It
supreme law of the land, it is a part of the law of each State.
Being a part of the law of each State it is but reasonable to
suppose that the States could give it force and effect in
their own peculiar way.

Had all the States taken this view

of the case and acted consistently with the purpose of the
Constitutional provision, no Congressional legislation would
have been necessary.

But the State of Virginia having failed

to do this, an early case.arose which gave great difficulty
and finally led to an Act of Congress which settled the main
questions of the case.tb)
See. 3

REVIEW OF TI-.

CASE.

in the year 1790, Governor

lifflin of Pennsylvania, made a demand upon Governor Randolph
of Virginia, for the delivery of three persons alleged guilty
of kidnapping a free negro in Pennsylvania and selling him
into slavery in Virginia.

The demand was accompanied by a

memorial from the Society for the Abolition of Slavery, and
Sa) In Re Romaine 23 Cal.525.
b) See Article by J.A.Haagne in Sen.L.Rev.vol.12 pp I81-243.

by an indictment against the parties, sworn to by the prothonotary of the court in which.the indictment was found.

Gov-

ernor Randolph referred the matter to the Attorney General of
Virginia and the latter wrote an opinion adverse to delivering
the parties in accordance with the demand.

Among the reasons

urged by Governor Randolph in his answer justifying his refusal to deliver the fugitives up was the following:"No means
have been provided for carrying into effect such an important
clause of the Cocstitution of the United States.

Legal con-

trol of a person ought to be acquired by no force not specified and by positive law.f/
20 State Papers pp. 29, 43.
Here then was the violation of a right established by the
organic law of the nation but rendered null and of no effect
by the lack of the means of its exercise.

The wonder is that

Virginia did not grasp the import of the Constitutional clause
and provide the means herself of doing justice to the parties.
Without a doubt the question of slavery had much to do with
the decision arrived at.
However, in 1791 Governor 1ifflin sent all of the correspondence that had passed between him and Governor Randolph
with reference to the matter, to Pres. Washington and recem-

mended that the question be submitted to Congress.

President

Washington referred the matter to Attorney General Edmund Randolph who after careful consideration wrote an opinion in
which he defined the necessities of the situation, and the
Act which followed simply embodied the Attorney General's
recommendat ions.
Sec. 4

THE ACT OF FEB.12th 1793.

This Act consisting

of but two sections as found in the Revised Statutes comprehends the whole Congressional legislation upon the question
of inter-state extradition.

The first section of the Act as

it appears in Sec. 5278 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States, is as follows: "Whenever the executive of any State
or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice of
the executive authority of any State or Territory to which
such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment
found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State
or Territory charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, aertified as authentic by
the Governor or Chief 1iagistrate of the State or Territory
from whence the person so charged has fled, it shall be the
duty of the executive authority of the State or Territory to
which such person has fled to cause him to be arrested and

secured, and to cause notice of the arrest to be given to the
executive authority making such demand, or to an agent of
such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and to
cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall
appear.

if no such agent appears within six months from the

time of arrest, the prisoner may be discharged.

All costs

or expenses incurred in apprehending, securing, and transritting such fugitive to the State making the demand shall be
paid by such State or Territory".
Note.

Sec. 5279 U.S.R.S. is not important in this connection

so is omitted here.)
Sec. 5

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TIM ACT.

The constitu-

tionality of the law was vigorously attacked in the celebrated
case of Prigg v The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania decided in
the year 1342.

The case arose urder another section of the

Act viz; the one which provided for the surrender of fugitive
slaves, but the grounds of attack were equally vital to the
section now under consideration.

It was contended on the

part of the State that no clause in the Constitution conferred
upon Congress the right to pass the Act in question.

The

court were unanimously of the opinion, however, that Congress
was clearly within the scope of the powers given by implica-

tion in the Constitution.

Said Mr.Justice Story in his

opinion, "No one has ever supposed that Congress could constitutionally, by its legislation exercise powers or enact
laws beyond the 'powers delegated to it by the Constitution.
But it has on various occasions, execcised powers which were
necessary and proper as means to carry into effect rights
expressly given, and duties expressly enjoined thereby".

And

again, "From that time (1793) down to the present hour not
a doubt has been breathed upon the constitutionality of this
Act.

And every Executive in the Union has acted upon and

admitted its validity". Then if this law is constitutional
simply because it

was for the purpose of carrying into effect

"rights expressly given", it must follow that any and all
laws that have the same object in view would be constitutional unless in conflict with some other clause or clauses of
the Constitution.

In other words, Congress may, should it

see fit, pass laws regulating the whole course of procedure
necessary to the efficient exercise of the extradition power.
For example, should the Governors of various States refuse to
respond to demands properly made, so as practically to threaten the continuance of the power to extradite offenders, Congress could designate some other person upon whom to make the

demand.

And it must be remembered in this connection that

the case of Kentucky v Dennison (.a) decides nothing as to the
constitutionality of such laws further than this, that the
Governor of a State, being the chief State official cannot be
compelled to perform Federal dutics.

For if he couled in one

case, he could in any number of cases, and in theory at least,
the chief State officer might thus be converted into a Federal
official.

If Congress, therefore, should deem it advisable

to codify the laws of procedure relating to the subject of
inter-state extradition, there would seem to be no valid objection.

And in passing it might be remarked that in the

year 1837 such a code was formulated by a convention of delegates representing the Governors of nineteen different
which met in New York City.( a)

States,

There can be little doubt

that proper legislation by Congress would greatly reduce the
present difficulties of the question.
Having found that Congress may regulate any and all
matters pertaining to inter-state rendition of fugitives from
justice, it yet remains to discover what laws passed by the
States, having the same object in view would be constitutional,
This will form the subjeet for discussion in the next chapter.
(a) Report of the Inter-state Extradition Conference by
Goodwin Brown.

CHAPTER III.
Sea.

1

PRIGG v THE COMI-ONWEALT.

Utterances have

been made by Judges of the greatest respectability and learning which seem to decide that inasmuch as Congress has the
power to pass laws covering the whole field of inter-state
extradition, the States are thereby precluded from passing
any laws whatever on the same subject.

Much of the confus-

ion on this question had its origin in the case of Prigg v
Commonwealth (a) referred to supra.

Judge Story in that

case referring to the Act of 1793 spoke as follows, "In a
geheral senee this act may be said to cover the whole ground
of the Constitution both as to fugitives from justice and
fugitive slaves ......... If this be so then it would seem upon
just principles of construction, that the legislation of Congress, if constitutional must supercede all State legislation
upon the subject and by necessary implication prohibit it.....
S.In such a case the legislation of Congress in what it does
prescribe manifestly indicates that it does not intend that
there shall be any further legislation to act upon the matter".
But these words of Judge Story are by no means the words of
the Supreme Court of the United States.

On this point both

Chief Justice Taney and Justice Thrmpson dissented.

At best

the words are obiter dicta since this point was not necessary
to the decision of the case.

Said C.J.Taney, "I do not con-

sider thts question as necessarily involved in the case before
us; for the law of Pennsylvania, under which the plaintiff in
error was prosecuted, is clearly in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, as well as with the law of
1793 .......... The opinion of the court maintains that the
power over this subject is so exclusively vested in Congress
that no State, since the adoption of the Constitution, can
pass any law in relation to it.

I think the States are not

prohibited; and that on the contrary, it is enjoined upon them
as a duty".

This seems to be the better rule, and coincides

with the understanding of those States which, as has been
pointed out, have enacted laws of their own to guide them in
these proceedings.

Mr.Spear whose opinion is worthy of re-

spect in this connectionsays, "The provision is to be carried
into effect so as on the one hand to secure the right which
it creates, and on the other hand secure the duty which it
imposes ........ Congress has legislated upon the subject.
it had not done so,

if

it would clearly be the duty of each State

to supply the requisite legislation for the delivery up of
fugitive criminals when demanded by other States in accordance

with the Constitutionft. a)

However it would clearly be sur-

plusage for the States to pass laws covering the same ground
as those passed by Congress.

State legislation on the sub-

ject should be supplementary to National legislation.

With

this in view the closing inquiry of this thesis will be to
determine:,1. How much of the procedure in inter-state extradition
proceedings has been provided for by Congress, and
2. What remains as a proper field for State legislation.
See. 2

PROCEDURE PROVIDED FOR BY CONGRESS.

By a care-

ful analysis of the Act of Feb. 12th 1793 it will be found
that the following details of procedure are prescribed:1. That the demand must be made by the executive authority
of the State from which the fugitive has fled.
2. That the demand must be made upon the executive authority of the asylum State.
3. The specific manner of making the charge and of issuing the requisition is provided.
4. The person to whom the fugitive is to be delivered is
designated.
It will be seen at once that but a portion of the pro(a) Spear on Extradit ion p.294;- For decisions pf differenti
Cora. v Tracy 40
States see Ex Parte White 49 Cal.433;
Ylass.536; Robinson v Flanders 29 Ind.IO: Buimp's Notes on
Can. Decisions p.297.

cedure is covered by the four provisions above.

What remains

is for the States to regulate, so long as it remains unregulated by Congress.
Sec. 3

OPPORTUNITY FOR STATE LEGISLATION.

The machin-

ery of the Federal govermient is not set in motion until a
The steps, therefore, which are mere-

demand has been made.

ly prelirainary to the demand must be taken in accordance with
State laws.

For example, the States must say what evidence

of guilt shall be necessary to justify the demand.

They may

place limitations upon the discretionary power of their own
Governors both as to making the demand as well as granting
the requisition papers.

So far as the Constitution and Act

of Congress ate concerned, the Governor of the offended State
ray demand or refuse to demand a fugitive from justice.

Like-

wise, as has been shown, the Governor of the asylum State has
full discretion as to making the surrender.

The Act of Con-

gress provides that when proper steps have been taken, it
shall be the duty of the Governor to have the fugitive "arrested and secured",

but the precise manner in which the ar-

rest is to be made is of necessity to be provided for by the
States.(a)

Also the Act of Congress speaks of the criminal

who has "fled" from justice, but not a word is said as to the
(a) Ex Parte A=mons 34 Ohio St. 518.

Manner of proving that he has fled.

Nor does the Act of Con-

Eress Iprovide any rule for deteriining the identity of the

party charged.
therefore,

The following specific details of procedure

fall$ prorerly under the purview of State legis-

lation: 1. The States may prescribe rules for determining what
circuvnstances shall comypel the Governor of the offended State
to make the demand.
2. The States uay prescribe rules for determining what
circumstances shall compel the Governor of the asyliun State
to make the surrender.
3. The States ;nay prescribe rules to determine how the
arrest shall be made; also to provide that arro st nlay be made
prior to demand.
4. The Staes may prescribo rules to deterrine what evidence shall be sufficient to prove that the person sought to
be extradited has "fled" from justice.
5. The States may prescribe rules to determine the iden-

tity of the person charged.

a)

CONCLUS IC i.
After the investigation which ha, been necessary to arrive at the proper understanding of the question with which
Sa) See Spear on Extradition p.509.

this thesis has to do, the writer has became convinced that
there is a ;rossing need for legislation that shall secure
greater uniformity in the practice connected with inter-state
extradition

irocedings,
it
has been shown that there is a

more or less broad field o.r.en to the exercise of the legislative power by either the States or the National goverrinent.
If the States continue to exercise the power, there will be a
great variety of rules which shall inevitably be in conflict,
unless some means be adopted to arrive at uniformity of action

Conflicting laws will occasion a certain anount of friction
between the States, and will it-.terfere with the speedy administration of justice.
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that any legislation w;:hich shall facilitate the prompt delivery of fugitive criminals ought to be *provided in one or
the other of the tw.o w ays.
Whether Congress or the States shall pro,:ide uniform
rules of practice is

a question that admits of some argument,

The States at best could adopt no system of rules not subject
to change o(y any State at its discretion.

Rules adopted by

Congress would,

on the contrary,

have the force and effect of

Ilaw equally binding upon all of th, States.

And as

there

cer. be no valid reason why the matter should not be regulated
by Congress, it would seem that this would be preferable to
State reUPlption.

